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Abstract—With developing of computation tools in the last years, 
data analysis methods to find insightful information are becoming 
more common among industries and researchers. This paper is the 
first part of the times series analysis of New England electricity price 
and demand to find anomaly in the data. In this paper time-series 
stationary criteria to prepare data for further times-series related 
analysis is investigated. Three main analysis are conducted in this 
paper, including moving average, moving standard deviation and 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The data used in this paper is New 
England big data from 9 different operational zones. For each zone, 4 
different variables including day-ahead (DA) electricity demand, price 
and real-time (RT) electricity demand price are considered. 
Index Terms— 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electricity grids are required to operate under reliability and 
integrity of data. With constant increasing electricity usage 
and need for smart grids development, ensuring data safety is 
another biggest challenge of system operation (SOs). 
Ahmadian [1] demonstrated a new model to participate in the 
market considering a nodal price limitation, which respects to 
the security of the data driven from the grid. According to Ray 
[2] risk management of the data is another critical issue with 
the cyber-security objective, which results in the resiliency 
impact of the system. Another example of the secured data 
driven from renewable energies is the assurance of the 
weather impacted data, which might result in noise and un-
accuracy of the model [3]. Cyber-attacks toward electricity 
grids are reported in many researches [4]-[6] and therefore, 
different methods are presented to detect or prevent cyber-
attacks, toward energy infrastructure. In [7] - [11], the attacks 
to automatic generation controls are investigated and 
counter-measurement actions using generation control 
diagrams are presented. Implementing statistical and data 
analysis methods, different detection algorithms are 
presented in [12]. in [13] using anomaly detection methods 
cyber-attacks are explored. In [14] support vector machines 
are used to find false data injection (FDI) attacks toward smart 
grids. In [15] cyber-attacks using generative adversarial 
networks (GANs) are presented and counter measurement 
actions are introduced via zero-sum game theory [16] between 
cuber attackers and So. The attacks toward electricity network 
might be due to monetary or non-monetary goals. In the 
monetary goals, the attacker injects FDI to change the 
electricity market state variables (DA or RT electricity price) 
[17] - [18]. In the non-monetary attacks however, the attacker 
aims to disrupt the operation of power systems by 
malfunctioning any communication infrastructure or 
protecting devices in the system. In these series of papers, 
using the big data published on New England power system 
operator [19] [22] the attackers toward electricity market 
(monetary attacks) are investigated. Since, electricity prices 
and demands are function of times, thus, the times-series 
analysis are presented in these series of papers (part1-part 4). 
The first step to do any times-series analysis is to test whether 
time-series is stationary or non-stationary and if not, the 
question will rise that how can we make the data to become 
stationary. Statistically, a times-series is said to be stationary if 
and if only follows the the three following conditions: 
1. Constant mean 
2. Constant standard 
3. Auto covariance doesn’t depend on times 
It must be mentioned that to do further analysis, timesseries 
must have the stationary conditions and therefore, in this 
paper and in the following parts the aforementioned criteria 
are investigated for the New England big data. 
II. MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION ANALYSIS 
Any times-series data consist of three main parts: 1. trend, 
2. seasonality or cyclicality, 3. residual error. There are specific 
methods to decompose time-series into these three parts that 
we will talk about in the next part of our times-series analysis 
to find the cyber-attacks [23]. In this part, the trend for times-
series is explored in terms of moving average/weighted 
average and moving standard deviation. In fact, moving ( or 
rolling in some literature) average is a powerful tool to smooth 
the times-series and visualize the trend in the data. Moving 
average (MA) or moving standard deviation (Mstd) are 
respectively, the mean and standard deviation of data using 
”n” prior samples [24]. In another word, a window of ”n” past 
sample is considered and average and standard deviation is 
calculated as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
  (3) 
In some literature, exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) is considered instead of simple moving average. The 
(4) shows the formula for 
  (4) 
Figs. [10]-[14] show the MA, EWMA and Mstd for electricity 
demand and price for the DA and RT market in the 9 zones of 
New England operation system. As it is shown the times-series 
seem to be stationary for almost all the data. However, further 
investigation required to make sure the stationary conditions 
are met [25]. 
One of the common approaches to make the time-series as 
stationary, is to transfer them into different shapes. However, 
the Figs. [2]-[9] show that the original data is stationary, to 
make the analysis more comprehensive common 
transformations are introduced in this part. It must be 
emphasized that id the data is not stationary, we would do the 
following transformation and then we use transformed data to 
do the prediction or to fit ARIMA models [26]. 
A. Logarithmic Transformation 
One of the common ways of smoothing data is to transform 
data using logarithmic function. In the following, the 
logarithmic transformation and corresponding MA, EWMA 
and Mstd are depicted for 9 zones. [fig 10-18] 
B. Removing MA Transformation 
By removing MA, the transformed time-series would be: 
(Transformed time − series) = 
(5) 
(Original times − series) − (MA) 
Thus the corresponding results would be gained:[fig 19-27] 
C. Removing EWMA transformation 
Equation. (6) shows this transformation: 
(Transformed time − series) = 
(6) 
(Original times − series) − (EWMA) 
Figures. [28]-[36] show the corresponding new time-series 
implementing (6) . 
D. Removing Logarithmic MA Transformation 
This transformation is like (5) but both original data and MAs 
are in the logarithmic transformation as below: 
log(new time − series) = 
(7) 
log(Original times − series) − log(MA) 
III. AUGMENTED DICKY-FULLER TEST 
In this part, the simple Dicky-Fuller and also Augmented 
Dicky-Fuller (ADF) are explained. In fact, ADF one of the most 
powerful and common industrial tools for testing data 
stationarity. However, MA, EWMA and Mstd are the easy and 
effective tools to test the stationarity by visualizing the data, 
ADF test is more scientific way of analyzing times series in 
terms of being stationary or non-stationary. In following, first 
DF and the ADF are introduced. Then, the analysis for any of 4 
different transformation in the part 2 will be discussed. 
A. Dickey-Fuller Test 
Times Series (TS) generally can be divided into three 
categories based on their trends: 1. deterministic trend TS, 2. 
stochastic trend TS, 3. combination of stochastic and 
deterministic. In order to develop a TS model that can predict 
the future values, we need to make sure that TS doesn’t 
explode as time increases. Unit root or DF test is the measure 
that we can apply to see TS is stationary or not. Before going 
further, at first we need to discuss three aforementioned 
categories, respectively. 
1) Deterministic Trend TS: In this model, we assume that TS 
variable yt is a function of time (yt = f(t)). This approximation 
can be linear, exponential or other types of fitting problems 
(piecewise linear, polynomial and etc.). 
 yt = α0 + βt + εt (8) 
If we calculate the ∆yt, we would have: 
yt − yt−1 = (α0 + βt + εt) − (α0 + βt−1 + εt−1) 
(9) 
∆yt = β + εt − εt−1 
In (9), it is clear that: 
E[∆yt] = E[B] + E[εt] + E[εt−1], 
(10) 
E[εt] = E[εt−1] = 0 
Thus: 
 E[∆yt] = B (11) 
It means that the average of corresponding time series ∆yt 
is constant over the time and therefore the ∆yt is stationary TS. 
Moreover, linear trend TS in (8) is also called trend stationary 
TS. 
2) Stochastic Trend TS: In the type of TS modelling, it is 
considered that yt is a function of flagged yt. The simple case is 
called first order. Auto regression model in which yt is only a 
function of first lag (k=1). This model is called ARCll: 
 yt = α0 + Φyt−1 + εt (12) 
Based on DF test, it is proven that as long as |Φ| < 1, TS in 
(12) is stationary. To investigate more, let’s consider Φ = 1, in 
this case we have: 
yt = α0 + βt−1 + εt 
yt−1 = α0 +.βt−1 + εt−1 
(13) 
                   y0 =. y0 
Replacing the recursive (yt−p,p = 1,2,...,t − 1) values in yt, we 
have: 
t 
 yt = tα0 + y0 + Xεi (14) 
i=1  
will t y, the average values of tAs (14) shows, by increasing the 
change and thus, the TS becomes non-stationary and 
unpredictable. The TS model in (12), when Φ = 1 is called 
, then TS is called random = 00 α). If 0αrandom walk with drift (
walk. The random walk is a process that can not be predicted, 
or in another word, there is no pattern in the data to predict. 
Mathematically speaking, random walk is: 
 yt = yt−1 + εt (15) 
Moreover, in a random walk process (model) the best 
prediction for t+1 values is the current value plus some noise 
(error term). Thus, it can be concluded that the random walk 
is a non-stationary TS. It also a problem that the mean value of 
random walk is constant however, the variable is not. 
3) Unit Test or DF Test: In a stationary system, the effect of 
any shock will damp, gradually. However, in a non-stationary 
system, the shocks have permanent influences on the system. 
In (12) for |Φ = 1|, the problem is called to have the unit root. 
Meanwhile for the |Φ > 1|, the TS becomes divergent or 
exploded when t → ∞. To test whether the TS is stationary, DF 
test poses the Null and alternative hypothesis as follows: 
  (16) 
To run Df test, we just need to run the simple least square 
regression to obtain the t-statistic for predicted value of γ 
(which is considered as γ). The t-statistic for γ is as follows: b
  
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠(𝛾) =
𝛾
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝛾 
 
(17) 
By Using (17), the p-value can be obtained easily and then 
based on the specified significant level (α = 0.05), if the p-
value is less than α, then we can reject the H0 (Null 
hypothesis). Indeed if we assume that the H0 is true, and 
statistical values (mean, std, t-statistic and etc.) for a sample 
of our population, then p-value is the probability of getting 
another sample (or better to say probability of generating a 
sample) with statistical values of what we already calculated 
for a given sample. If this probability is less than α, it means 
that although it is assumed that probability of getting 
statistical values of a sample instead of values in H0 is less 
than %α (%5 traditionally, but it happened for a given 
sample). Thus, the H0 values are not trustworthy or we have 
enough evidence to reject the Null hypothesis. On the other 
hand, if the p-value is greater than α it means that 
considering H0 to be true, the probability of getting another 
sample of data with the same values in H0 is high and we 
can’t reject the Null hypothesis. In the case of TS and Df test, 
if the p-value of DF test is less than significance level (α), we 
reject the Null hypothesis or better to say we reject that or TS 
is any form of random walk and or TS is stationary. 
B. Augmented DF Test with Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
For the TS s with linear trends, or more complicated TSs, the 
first lag differences also doesn’t lead to a stationary TS. 
Therefore, the general form of DF test using p-lags can be used 
to find the number of optimal lags to make a TS stationary. The 
general form of DF test, which also is known as ADF, is as 
follows: 
 ∆yt = α0 + γyt−1 + θ1∆yt−1 + ... + θp∆yt−p + εt (18) 
It must be noted that the test hypothesis is the same as before. 
The most important issue in the problem of finding the optimal 
lags is the evaluation metric for different models. It is clear that 
by adding more lags to the (18), R2 and Radj2 of regression 
models change and therefore, they are not suitable evaluation 
metrics for models that have different regresses (different 
features). In fact, by adding more features to our regression 
model, we need the feature selection assessment tools to find 
the optimal model. ACI is the most common measurement 
tools in which not only considers the likelihood but also 
penalize the model for getting bigger (adding more features). 
The ACI formula is as follows: 
ACI = −2log(MSE) + 2(degree of freedom (or) 
(19) 
number of in dependant variables) 
The general flow chart for ADF test and to find the optimal p-
lag isdepicted at Fig. 10: 
IV. RESULTS FOR NEW ENGLAND BIG DATA 
In this section, results of ADF test for all the TSs and their 
transformed version is calculated to see whether the given TS 
for any of 9 operational zones of NE system is non-stationary. 
After implementing ADF test, the next parts of this paper will 
address the cyber-attacks problem in electricity grids. But 
before doing any analysis, the first step is stationary test that 
we discussed in this paper. 
A. Processing All Zones’ Data for DA and RT electricity price 
and demand 
In following, different zones are analyzed based on 
transformations and aforementioned sections. 
1) ADF for ISONE: Figure 2 shows the original DA and RT 
electricity price and demand data based on the hourly,daily, 
weekly and monthly time horizons for zone 1 (with code name 
ISONE CA). 
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 Fig. 2. Original DA and RT data for electricity price and demand at ISONE CA. 
Fig. 4. Original DA and RT data for electricity price and demand at 
Burlington. 
4) ADF for Bridgeport: Figure 5 shows the original DA 
and RT electricity price and demand data based on the 
hourly,daily, weekly and monthly time horizons for zone 4 
(with code name 
Bridgeport). 
5) ADF for Providence: Figure 6 shows the original DA 
and RT electricity price and demand data based on the 
hourly,daily, weekly and monthly time horizons for zone 5 
(with code name Providence). 
6) ADF for SEMASS: Figure 7 shows the original DA and 
RT electricity price and demand data based on the 
hourly,daily, weekly and monthly time horizons for zone 6 
(with code name SEMASS). 
7) ADF for Worcester: Figure 8 shows the original DA and 
RT electricity price and demand data based on the 
hourly,daily, weekly and monthly time horizons for zone 7 
(with code name Worcester). 
Fig. 5. Original DA and RT data for electricity price and demand at 
Bridgeport. 
 
Fig. 6. Original DA and RT data for electricity price and demand at 
Providence. 
8) ADF for Boston: Figure 9 shows the original DA and RT 
electricity price and demand data based on the hourly,daily, 
weekly and monthly time horizons for zone 8 (with code name 
Boston). 
To continue the analysis the RT electricity prices for first 
zone (ISONE CA) is investigated in following. 
B. Applying different transformation to Real-Time prices at 
ISONE 
In this section, the transformation filters mentioned in 
Section II are illustrated and compared to each other. Fig. 10 
shows the linear transformation of real-time prices. After 
removing the MA, the data become smoother and easier to 
process. Fig. (11), shows the logarithmic transformation and 
the removed exponential moving average of the data. Fig. 12 
also shows the first and second gradient of the real-time price. 
It is depicted clearly that these two time-series are stationary. 
Fig. 13 is also the logarithmic and removed logarithmic MA 
of RT prices. It is shown that after removing the logarithmic 
MA, the TS becomes flat around the zero and it is obviously an 
stationary time-series. 
Fig. 7. Original DA and RT data for electricity price and demand at SEMASS. 
 Fig. 8. Original DA and RT data for electricity price and demand at Worcester. 
C. ADF test results 
In this part the ADF results for different transformation 
filters are shown in TABLE I-IV. As shown, all the data from 
Real-Time (RT) prices and Critical-Value (CV) for 1%, 5% and 
10% are categorized in ISONE CA, PORTLAND,CONCORD and 
BOSTON . 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the stationary test for electricity price as well 
as demand is presented. The presented test uses the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) method to find the correlation 
between element of electricity price and demand as time-
series. To identify the False Data Injection (FDI), this paper 
presents an efficient and fast algorithm based on ADF. Using 
ACI metric as the objective function of the presented 
algorithm, the stationary data as well as the optimal number 
of lags for each time-seris are obtained and can be compared 
with any real-time values to find mismatch and data anomaly. 
The results for real-time electricity price for first zone of New 
England system verifies the proposed method. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
All the simulations for this paper are implemented by 
python using the codes from Dr. S. Ahmadian github repository 
[20]. The authors would like to thank him for all his support 
and efforts for this paper. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. first and second gradient of RT prices 
Fig. 13. The logarithmic and removed logarithmic MA 
 
 
 
TABLE I ISONE CA DATA 
ISONE CA Test Statistic P-Value #Lags Used Observations CV*(1%) CV*(5%) CV*(10%) 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Logarithmic and removed exponential moving average of the data. 
 TABLE II PORTLAND DATA 
PORTLAND Test Statistic P-Value  #Lags Used Observations CV*(1%) CV*(5%) CV*(10%) 
 
TABLE III CONCORD DATA 
CONCORD Test Statistic P-Value  #Lags Used Observations CV*(1%) CV*(5%) CV*(10%) 
RT Price - 
3.495470938 
0.008104175 25 1771 -3.4340478 - 
2.863173373 
- 
2.567639557 
 0.011372244 19 1777 - - - 
 3.434035296 2.863167853 2.567636618 
 1.95093E-13 25 1771 -3.4340478 - - 
   
 
     
 
 
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
   
 
     
 
 
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
     
      
 
     
     
 
      
 
 2.863173373 2.567639557 
 1.56965E-13 19 1771 - - - 
 3.434035296 2.863167853 2.567636618 
 2.78359E-18 25 1771 -3.4340478 - - 
 2.863173373 2.567639557 
 3.00852E-16 25 1771 -3.4340478 - - 
 2.863173373 2.567639557 
 2.38447E-27 17 1779 - - -2.56763467 
 3.434027007 2.863164194 
 
TABLE IV 
BOSTON DATA 
BOSTON Test Statistic P-Value #Lags Used Observations CV*(1%) CV*(5%) CV*(10%) 
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